Real zombies don\u2019t exist.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In this mind experiment, a \u2018philosophical zombie\u2019 acts and speaks entirely like you or me, but has no soul, no deep feelings, or no feelings at all \u2014 probably depending on the year of invention.<\/p>\n\n\n\n This confusion is also important for our argumentation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n More generally, the philosophical zombie has no consciousness, but you don\u2019t clearly see that. Well, its eyes may be empty. Furthermore, it acts like you while probably wanting to grab you for some zombie reason.<\/p>\n\n\n\n It\u2019s a mess.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The question is: Is it possible to act indistinguishably (except the grabbing) like a human but without consciousness?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Some like to see a \u2018yes\u2019 answer as proof that consciousness is something magical that comes on top of everything else (‘epiphenomenal’) about you or me. Because: In that case, consciousness cannot be explained by what lies under the hood: feelings, deep feelings, soul stuff\u2026 Moreover, consciousness would be inconsequential because the zombie does everything without it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The answer is, of course, \u2018yes\u2019 \u2015 in theory. However, a zombie without feelings would be like a cheap kind of robot \u2014 a mechanism with nothing to which we would ascribe consciousness. That is not illuminating: no feelings, no motivations, no consciousness. The zombie may still grab you, but by itself, it may not even want<\/em> to grab you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Where there are no feelings, it\u2019s challenging to emulate them. Actions and reactions would have to be explicitly programmed. We would need many \u2013 or very clever \u2013 programmers if the zombie robot were to simulate us (as beings with feelings) entirely. It\u2019s challenging but feasible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n What about deep feelings?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n In this case, the zombie may have feelings but no depth and still no consciousness. It would thus be even more difficult to discern whether the creature would or would not be a normal human being. You need to look deep into the eyes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Or wouldn\u2019t you?<\/p>\n\n\n\n And what about the zombie? It would know to lack deep feelings (deep motivations, deep meaningfulness, etc.) if it would have consciousness. As to emulation, it would be very<\/em> challenging but feasible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As to soul stuff, I leave that mainly to the theologians.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Now, the situation is: feelings, deep feelings, but no soul and no consciousness.<\/p>\n\n\n\n As far as I\u2019m concerned, this situation is very much like the prior one, though probably even much more challenging.<\/p>\n\n\n\n The last straw: feelings, deep feelings, soul, but no consciousness.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Even theologians would agree that this is no zombie anymore \u2015 not even in a mind experiment. But it would also not be no zombie. Straightforwardly, this is an impossible situation. The philosopher Daniel C. Dennett calls such creature a ‘zimbo’ (that would even wrongly think itself to be conscious) and agrees that it would not be possible, not even in the mind experiment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n There cannot be an absence of consciousness without an absence of the other factors.<\/p>\n\n\n\n In other words:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n Eventually, the philosophical zombie that increasingly emulates us closely would also internally be increasingly like us until all the difference would vanish. At that moment, we\u2019re not talking about a zombie anymore \u2013 nor a zimbo \u2013 but about us \u2015 conscious beings.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Consciousness is intrinsically bound to what\u2019s under the hood, including to what lies deep inside.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Call this the \u2018essential drive to thrive\u2019 if you please.<\/p>\n\n\n\n Please don\u2019t call it magic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n If you do so nevertheless, then we all end up to be zombies \u2015 no magic.<\/p>\n\n\n\n <\/p>\n